An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, operating from China. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that an element about this method would be amiss. Nevertheless, China’s powerful intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to use recruitment consultants to try it – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director stated Chinese agents were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, industrial, military and technological secrets. However a new initiative targeting politicians and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.
A spying warning was issued on Tuesday via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their staffers, economic experts, research organizations – anybody who might provide information.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no official release of the protective guidance from the agency or the interior ministry. But the service knew its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the media helps the general population more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the impact of uncovering additional details from within Westminster, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The service wants people in public life to recognize that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, though the recent actions does come after the awkward collapse of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for China – a charge they rejected – but inability to complete a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in spying operations face substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if somebody participates in conduct that could potentially “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural inquiry, however, is what China has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the Britain's China policy on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like China’s utilize intelligence collection methods and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is willing to develop contacts over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean someone rapidly marginal becomes important.
Another way to consider the relentless activities at secret information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the west at a level under the point of direct conflict. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the another operation compromise of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent efforts to find covert sources on British democracy via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it can.
